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ABSTRACT
Foreign aid strategies have undergone restructuring as donors adopt aid selectivity 
practice to improve aid effectiveness. This study investigates the impact of aid selectivity 
practice on aid effectiveness (aid-growth relationship) in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and 
several groups of countries within SSA from 1980 to 2012. Employing system generalized 
methods of moments (system GMM) technique; the study produces strong evidence that 
there is significant improvement in aid effectiveness due to aid selectivity practice.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In theory, foreign aid is expected to serve as a means of transferring capital from 
developed economies to developing ones. By doing this, it is likely that aid would 
stimulate social and economic reforms by providing funds for development projects 
such as infrastructure, technologies, education, health, and revitalizing crises strick-
en economies; thus, resulting in economic growth. However, there has been a long 
standing and sustained debate about aid-growth relationship that has challenged the 
effectiveness of aid on several grounds; making the aid-growth link vague. Empiri-
cal evidences have shown that some of the high recipient countries of foreign aid in 
the world especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) such as Central African Republic 
and Malawi are still unable to account for positive corresponding growth, while few 
countries like Niger has recorded significant economic progress (see Leeson, 2008).
Interestingly, an important question to ask, is why aid works in certain coun-
tries and fails in some others? Past studies have highlighted several determinants of 
aid effectiveness. The study that made the most popular qualified analysis of aid ef-
fectiveness is that of Burnside and Dollar (2000), which posits that macroeconomic 
policy is an important determining factor of the growth promoting impact of foreign 
aid. For instance, foreign aid is expected to be more effective in countries with good 
macroeconomic policies than countries with bad macroeconomic policies. Other 
studies such as Collier and Dehn (2001), Dalgaard, et al (2004), and Ang (2010) 
opined that export price shocks, climate related differences and financial liberalisa-
tion, respectively are channels through which aid affects growth. 
Against the background, foreign aid strategies have undergone fundamental 
reassessment as donors have come up with several measures to ensure that aid be-
comes more effective. Initially, the concept of aid conditionality1 was the practice by 
the donor community. This practice went through little change after the influential 
study of Burnside and Dollar (2000). After the study, it was acknowledged that aid 
did promote growth but should be allocated to countries that have adopted good poli-
cies. As a result, aid selectivity or ex-post conditionality (Ramiarison, 2010) came 
into practice - where in some cases, foreign aid is attached to several considerations 
and prerequisites such as macroeconomic policy reforms, governance, and poverty 
or need, among others. As a general measure of adequacy in recipient countries, aid 
selectivity in the recent times, in most cases, is pinned on the state of governance. 
Consequently, efforts toward good governance in developing countries have become 
a condition for attracting development assistance. However, because donors also 
consider other factors related to living standards such as poverty when giving aid, 
it becomes difficult for donors to aim at good governance alone as prerequisite for 
aid as countries with weak governance most time record low living standards. As a 
result, aid selectivity practice becomes difficult to implement. Nevertheless, Collier 
1  The act of conditioning aid on promises of policy reforms
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(1999) suggested a dynamic case for a temporary increase in aid. That is, aid should 
be targeted at inducing policy reform and to increase it even after policies improve 
because the resulting growth needs to be sustained within a situation of low private 
investment. According to him, “aid needs to taper in with policy reform rather than 
to taper out with reform as it is the actual donor behaviour”.
A lot of weaknesses can still be identified in developing countries as regards 
economic reforms. This situation is likely an important reason why donors are agitat-
ing for elements that can boost the effectiveness of aid. For instance, in a summit on 
combating poverty in Africa, held at Gleneagle, Scotland on July 7-8, 2005, the G-8 
leaders reiterated the requirement for aid in their final Communiqué. They noted 
that aid is to be focused on low income countries committed to policy reforms such 
as growth and poverty reduction, democratic, accountable and transparent govern-
ment, and sound public financial management (Gleneagles Communique, 2005). 
All these practices are within the framework of aid selectivity - where aid flows are 
expected to be channelled to countries that have the necessary environment that can 
promote effective aid management.
The motivation for this study is therefore to empirically investigate the claim 
by several studies in the past around aid selectivity. For instance, the World Bank 
study titled “Assessing Aid” (1998) opined that the allocation of foreign aid would 
have greater impact on poverty reduction if it were targeted to the poorest coun-
tries and among them favoured the ones with stronger economic institutions and 
policies. Also, the study by Burnside and Dollar (2000) empirically confirmed the 
view of “Assessing Aid”, thus argued that aid is more effective in countries with 
good macroeconomic policies than others. To support the two above studies and 
related ones, Dollar and Levin (2006), argued that in year 2000-03, donors, es-
pecially multilateral ones are more selective in aid practice than in the year 1984-
89. Dollar and Levin (2006) revealed that donors have over the years acted on 
the two earlier referenced studies and related ones to start aid selectivity practice 
around year 2000. To conclude the debate on aid selectivity in the literature, the 
next important investigation should centre on evaluating aid selectivity practice. 
Therefore, the main focus of this study is to investigate the impact of aid selectiv-
ity practice on aid effectiveness in SSA. This study investigates total aid, official 
development assistance (ODA), as against grouping into multilateral and bilateral 
aid. Beyond aggregate SSA regression, this study also investigates several groups 
of countries for robust analysis. Based on the information available to the author, 
this is the first study to carry out an empirical investigation on the effectiveness of 
aid selectivity practice.
This study employs a simple methodology by breaking the period of study into 
two. The first period covers 1980-2000 (pre-selectivity) and the second period cov-
ers 2001-2012 (post-selectivity). System generalized methods of moments (system 
GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
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(1998) is used for estimations. The study concludes that aid is more effective in post-
selectivity period as against its ineffective impact in pre-selectivity period.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents summary of past 
relevant empirical studies where aid effectiveness debate is well articulated. Section 
3 presents the methodology. Section 4 covers analyses of results where the result for 
pre and post-selectivity period are presented for aggregate SSA and for other groups 
of countries in SSA. Finally, section 5 presents conclusion.
2. SUMMARY OF PAST RELEVANT EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
The trend of debate in the literature on foreign aid and its effectiveness has been 
very interesting; starting from the justification for foreign assistance, built on the 
“Big Push” argument initiated by Rosenstein-Rodan (1943, 1944), and developed by 
Nurkse (1953) to the empirical studies by various authors. The “Big Push” argument 
suggests that underdeveloped countries need huge amount of investment to move 
away from backwardness to a path of economic development; but savings required 
for this huge investment was insufficient. Based on this, mainstream economics 
suggests a need for external sources of funds (the big push) aimed at complementing 
domestic savings. Through this means, the ‘financing gap’ that leaves the underde-
veloped countries stuck in a ‘poverty trap’ can be closed. Because most of the under-
developed countries have immature capital market coupled with high risk attached 
to business, they do not stand a chance of making that huge sum of money needed for 
investment purposes, enough to set them on the path of long run growth, both locally 
and through borrowing in international market. Accordingly, the ‘big push’ argu-
ment portrays external help (foreign aid) as the fundamental means to complement 
domestic savings, increase investment and in turn, ensure long run desired growth.
Since the big push argument, several studies have endeavoured to investigate 
the need for aid and the effectiveness of aid. To do this, extant empirical studies on 
aid effectiveness concentrated more on aid-growth nexus using different theories 
and methodologies. As a result, these studies came up with different results which 
made aid effectiveness literature inconclusive and mix. Among the several existing 
studies, some argued for a positive relationship between aid and growth (see Islam, 
1992; Snyder, 1993; Gounder, 2001; Moreira, 2005; Chowdhury and Das, 2011; and 
Kargbo, 2012, among others). Authors in this category were of the opinion that aid 
increased growth by augmenting savings, financing investments and increasing pro-
ductivity. Conversely, studies such as Friedman, 1958; Bauer, 1972; Boone, 1994 and 
1996; Dhakal, Upadhyaya and Upadhyaya, 1996; Bowen, 1998; Easterly, 1999 and 
2001; Kanbur, 2000; Radelet, 2006; Duc, 2006; Mallik, 2008; and Leeson, 2008, 
among others, argued for a negative relationship between aid and growth. A general 
consensus of this category of study was that aid failed to induce growth. However, 
each study gave different reasons for supporting this claim. Among the reasons given 
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are misused of aid (aid fungibility), corruption, poor administration, tying up of aid 
with precious resources in recipient countries and questionable aid allocation deci-
sions by donors, aid caused investment disincentive for private sector, aid caused 
savings reduction, bad policies environment (e.g Boone 1996), extremely low level 
of human capital (e.g Kosack and Tobin, 2006) and volatility in aid disbursement by 
donors (e.g Kathavate, 2013).
The above highlighted two major strands in the literature caused several re-
flections and reconsiderations. Scholars started asking questions on the reasons 
why foreign aid would have significant negative relationship with economic growth. 
Thus, in a quest to find answers to this, the focus of aid effectiveness debate changed 
from ordinary aid-growth relationship investigation to a more in-depth one by in-
vestigating intermediate factors that could determine aid effectiveness. The ground 
breaking and leading study in this category was the study by Burnside and Dollar 
(2000) on 56 countries from 1970 to 1993. The study is focussed on answering two 
basic questions. One, is the effect of aid on growth conditional on economic policies? 
And two, do donor governments and agencies allocate more aid to countries with 
good policies? The answer to the first question is that aid had a positive impact on 
growth in developing countries with good macroeconomic policies (fiscal, monetary, 
and trade) but had little effect in the presence of poor policies. As a result, identi-
fying good policies as important ingredient for growth, the study suggested that aid 
would be more effective if it were more systematically conditioned on good policy. 
Answer to the second question will be discussed shortly. Other related studies such 
as Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001; Denkabe, 2003; Dalgaard, et. 
al. 2004; Asiedu and Nandwa, 2007; Rajan and Subramanian, 2008; and Minoiu and 
Reddy, 2009, came up with more factors such as governance, export shocks, financial 
liberalization, geographical factors, and so on as intermediate factors that determine 
aid effectiveness. 
As the debate on aid effectiveness broadens, scholars also investigated the 
second question of Burnside and Dollar (2000) that has to do with aid selectivity. 
For Burnside and Dollar (2000), their study argued that quality of policy had little 
impact on aid allocation. According to the study, there was no significant tendency 
for total aid or bilateral aid to favour good policy. In contrast, aid that was managed 
multilaterally (about one-third of the total) was allocated in favour of good policy. 
However, as the debate continues, studies started carrying out robust analysis on aid 
selectivity by employing different methodology from what was used in Burnside and 
Dollar (2000). Thus, many studies carried out periodic investigation and found that 
aid selectivity was not in practice in pre-2000, but was practiced in post-2000. For 
instance, Dollar and Levin (2006) focused their study on 1984-89 and 2000-2003. 
They found that multilateral aid was more selective than bilateral aid in targeting 
countries with good rule of law. During 1984-89, both bilateral and multilateral aid 
had significant negative relationships with rule of law; by 2000-03, this had shifted 
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to a significant positive relationship for multilateral aid, and a positive but statisti-
cally insignificant relationship for bilateral aid. To conclude their study, they found 
that total foreign aid was more selective in 2000-2003 than in 1984-89. Some stud-
ies such as Mohammad (2014) which focused its attention on 2001-2010, supported 
the findings of Dollar and Levin (2006) by producing strong evidence that countries 
with good governance were given preferential treatment by donors. The study found 
that among the six governance indicators, voice and accountability and control of 
corruption were critical in aid allocation decision. 
As can be observed from the above studies, empirical investigation on the im-
pact of aid selectivity practice on aid effectiveness has so far received little or no at-
tention. The focus of investigation in the past related to aid selectivity practice was 
to examine the extent to which foreign aid (multilateral and bilateral) is selective in 
terms of democracy and property rights/rule of law. Giving the position of debates 
in the literature, beyond establishing the fact that donors have adopted aid selectiv-
ity practice in post-2000 more than any other period in history, it is therefore im-
perative to extend the investigation to the effectiveness of aid selectivity practice. 
Having established that this study has not been able to find a study that empirically 
investigated the impact of aid selectivity practice on aid effectiveness, it endeavours 
to bridge the gap in the literature, and to find an answer to an important subject in 
aid administration. Consequently, results from this study will assist donors to either 
stick to aid selectivity practice or jettison it. To achieve this result, a simple meth-
odology is adopted where year 2000 is identified as the structural change year in aid 
administration.
3. METHODOLOGY
3.1. Empirical Model Specification and Variable Measurements
Following aid-growth literature, the objective of the study is investigated by es-
timating equation (1).
     
(1)
where ‘Y’ is the growth rate of real GDP per capita, ‘X’ is a vector of explanatory 
variables, ‘Z’ is a vector of control variables, ‘ɛ’ is the error term, subscript ‘i’ refers to 
country, ‘t’ refers to time, where β and γ are the estimated parameters. The explana-
tory variable in this study is foreign aid as a percentage of GDP (ODA/GDP). Control 
variables are initial level of GDP per capita (GDPt-1), investment as a percentage of 
GDP (INV/GDP), population growth (POPN) employed as a proxy for labour force 
growth, broad money as a percentage of GDP (M2/GDP) measures the development 
of financial markets, openness defined as total trade as a percentage of GDP (OPEN), 
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inflation (INF), government consumption as a percentage of GDP (GC/GDP), and 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF).
Generally, data used for estimation in this study cover 47 countries2 in SSA be-
tween the period 1980 and 2012. The study adopted the ELF indices computed by 
Roeder (2001), where countries with values close to zero are more homogeneous and 
countries with values close to one are more heterogeneous. GDP and other variables 
measured at year 2000 constant prices, US Dollars are sourced from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators (2014). Aggregate measurement of aid (ODA) is used.
3.2. Estimation Issues and Procedures
In the literature (see Burnside and Dollar, 2000; and Hansen and Tarp 2001; 
among others), the estimates from aid regression may be biased due to three factors. 
One, the possibility of endogeneity problem is very likely when estimating relation-
ship between foreign aid and growth. By definition, an explanatory variable is said to 
be endogenous if it correlates with error term. In such case, the inconsistency of es-
timation methods such as OLS cannot be overemphasized. Two, in estimating panel 
models, heterogeneity across countries and time is very likely due to a certain degree 
of cross-section dependence introduced by unobserved (heterogeneous) country 
and time-specific factors making the conventional estimators to be seriously biased. 
Finally, conditional convergence as a result of the inclusion of initial GDP in aid-
growth model as common in past studies makes the estimates generated from pooled 
regression and ordinary instrumental variable methods bias. 
To correct for the above shortcomings and at the same time build on previous 
studies (such as Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001; Dalgaard 
et. al., 2004; and Salisu and Ogwumike, 2010, among others) that employed OLS and 
instrumental variable (IV) methods of 2SLS, this study adopts the “system GMM” 
estimator, proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). 
The system GMM mitigates the problem of poor instrument in other dynamic panel 
GMM called “difference GMM3”. It identified that lagged levels are often rather poor 
instruments for first differenced variables, especially if the variables are close to a 
random walk. Thus, it includes lagged levels as well as lagged differences. Specifical-
ly, the system GMM uses additional moment conditions in which lagged differences 
of the dependent variable are orthogonal to levels of the disturbances. According to 
Asiedu and Nandwa (2007), another advantage of the system GMM estimator is that 
it reduces finite sample bias by exploiting additional moment conditions where the 
autoregressive parameter is only weakly identified from the first-differenced equa-
2  See Appendix C for the lists of countries. Somalia and South Sudan are not included in the empirical 
analysis due to data limitation.
3  Difference GMM estimator is proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). It uses lagged-levels of first 
difference of variables as instruments. 
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tion. This makes system GMM appropriate for regressions with small observations. 
Since the observations of the sub-samples in this study is small, system GMM be-
comes appropriate.
Aid selectivity effectiveness investigation is carried out by dividing the entire 
period of this study into two. Period before year 2000 is identified as pre-selectivity 
and period after year 2000 is identified as post-selectivity. The empirical models 
estimated for these two periods are the same to ensure uniformity. Consequently, 
comparisons are made between the two same sets of models of different time frames. 
Year 2000 is chosen for two major reasons. One, this is the year Burnside and Dollar 
published their popular paper and made campaign for good policies as a determinant 
of aid effectiveness widespread in the literature. Second, Dollar and Levin (2006) 
empirically found out that foreign aid was selective in 2000-03 other than 1984-89. 
Thus, year 2000 marks the time when aid practice changed and donors started en-
gaging in what is popularly referred to as aid selectivity. Thereafter, the entire period 
of this study is divided into two - the pre-selectivity period (1980 to 2000), and post-
selectivity period (2001 to 2012). This procedure to empirically investigate aid selec-
tivity effectiveness is novel and also consistent with the claim by Ramiarison (2010), 
where it is stated that aid selectivity or ex-post conditionality practice is as a result of 
the study by Burnside and Dollar (2000).
To arrive at the different categories of groups of countries investigated, the fol-
lowing are done. For the sub-regions of SSA, the study focuses on West Africa, East 
Africa, Central Africa, and Southern Africa. Oil producing category (resource endow-
ment) comprises oil producer and non-oil producer. Oil producers are countries that 
produce oil in commercial level and non-oil producer are those that do not produce oil 
in commercial level. Countries that newly discovered oil in commercial level are not 
included as oil producers in this study. Income level is determined by dividing SSA 
into two, using per capita income. The average income across SSA is determined after 
which countries that fall below the average income are categorised as low income and 
countries above are categorised as high income. Finally, aid intensity categorization is 
determined as in the case of income level. For reference purpose, the list of countries 
in each set of the several categories above is presented in the Appendices 1. - 7.
4. ANALYSES OF RESULTS
4.1. Descriptive Analysis
Descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study are presented in Table 1. 
The Table shows basic characteristics of the variables in terms of their average value 
(Mean), standard deviation (SD), minimum (Min) and maximum (Max) values, and 
coefficient of variation (CV). By definition, the mean value is the average outcome 
of a reference variable over specific time period. SD is the measure of dispersion of 
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variables from their reference mean, and it measures the variability of spread of data. 
Min and Max are the minimum and maximum values, respectively of the variable in 
question. As in SD, CV also measures dispersion but in a more standardized form. 
It is a normalized measure of dispersion of a probability or frequency distribution. 
It is defined as the ratio of standard deviation to mean. This definition makes it su-
perior to SD as it provides a vivid picture of relative variability. If CV is higher than 
0.50 (50%), dispersion is high, implying uneven distribution and higher variability; 
if otherwise, dispersion is low.
Table 1. is presented in such a way that facilitates comparisons of aggregate SSA 
statistics with that of the different regions such as West Africa, East Africa, Central 
Africa, and Southern Africa. The SSA countries are further classified into 3 other 
groups: oil and non-oil producers; high and low income countries; and high and low 
aid intensity countries. The analysis therefore follows a specific pattern. The average 
aggregate SSA statistics should be used as reference point for all other regions and 
groups. More importantly, comparisons should be made across regions and groups. 
For clarity and simplicity of analysis, reference should be made to the mean values.
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Table 1.: Descriptive Statistics of Major Variables: Aggregate SSA and Other Categories
West Africa East Africa
Variable Mean SD Min Max CV Variable Mean SD Min Max CV
PC 544.58 363.44 50.04 2749.48 0.67 PC 1248.388 2528.63 111.79 13889.95 2.03
PCGRT 0.65 7.74 -50.24 91.67 11.83 PCGRT 0.92 5.60 -47.31 36.77 6.09
ODA 15.86 15.89 0.06 181.19 1.00 ODA 14.29 11.51 -0.25 94.95 0.81
INV 17.82 8.36 -2.42 58.96 0.47 INV 17.82 6.92 2.00 47.85 0.39
POPN 13600000 27500000 301591 169000000 2.03 POPN 10200000 10600000 64400 47800000 1.04
OPEN 66.64 26.42 6.32 179.12 0.40 OPEN 61.02 28.34 10.95 144.70 0.46
ELF 0.73 0.15 0.32 0.90 0.21 ELF 0.61 0.25 0.08 0.92 0.41
Central Africa Southern Africa
PC 2077.70 2809.86 201.73 13518.04 1.35 PC 3028.55 1735.88 422.17 6693.75 0.57
PCGRT 2.10 12.27 -27.15 142.07 5.85 PCGRT 2.08 3.73 -8.69 16.96 1.80
ODA 10.02 11.63 -0.20 69.40 1.16 ODA 4.42 4.45 0.00 19.18 1.01
INV 29.62 32.39 1.93 219.07 1.09 INV 25.63 12.60 8.42 74.82 0.49
POPN 10200000 13400000 94953 65700000 1.31 POPN 9215433 15900000 603373 52300000 1.73
OPEN 97.36 80.62 20.06 531.74 0.83 OPEN 113.48 43.44 38.65 209.87 0.38
ELF 0.76 0.13 0.47 0.88 0.18 ELF 0.50 0.26 0.22 0.89 0.53
Oil Producers Non-oil Producers
PC 2568.16 2788.94 201.73 13518.04 1.09 PC 1034.22 1834.61 50.04 13889.95 1.77
PCGRT 1.53 11.77 -27.15 142.07 7.72 PCGRT 1.11 6.51 -50.24 91.67 5.87
ODA 6.38 10.63 -0.20 69.40 1.67 ODA 14.45 13.33 -0.25 181.19 0.92
INV 27.48 31.10 2.10 219.07 1.13 INV 19.29 9.79 -2.42 79.35 0.51
POPN 27800000 35500000 726454 169000000 1.28 POPN 7740606 8722152 64400 47800000 1.13
OPEN 96.44 77.48 20.44 531.74 0.80 OPEN 69.42 35.59 6.32 209.87 0.51
ELF 0.78 0.14 0.47 0.90 0.18 ELF 0.64 0.22 0.08 0.92 0.35
High Income Countries Low Income Countries
PC 4554.09 2929.69 1336.67 13889.95 0.64 PC 480.78 251.95 50.04 1324.99 0.52
PCGRT 3.03 10.21 -19.38 142.07 3.37 PCGRT 0.70 6.98 -50.24 91.67 9.97
ODA 4.04 5.01 -0.25 35.35 1.24 ODA 15.15 13.73 0.06 181.19 0.91
INV 27.27 22.35 3.62 218.99 0.82 INV 19.44 14.87 -2.42 219.07 0.77
POPN 6176610 11700000 64400 52300000 1.89 POPN 13300000 20600000 139428 169000000 1.55
OPEN 108.02 53.51 38.14 531.74 0.50 OPEN 65.74 42.18 6.32 504.88 0.64
ELF 0.61 0.20 0.27 0.92 0.33 ELF 0.68 0.22 0.08 0.92 0.32
High Aid Intensity Low Aid Intensity
PC 633.85 907.53 50.04 6742.23 1.43 PC 1786.63 2551.49 111.79 13889.95 1.42
PCGRT 1.26 8.38 -50.24 91.67 6.64 PCGRT 1.15 7.46 -27.15 142.07 6.51
ODA 24.42 15.32 12.92 181.19 0.63 ODA 6.06 3.87 -0.25 12.88 0.64
INV 22.74 19 -2.42 219.07 0.84 INV 19.87 15.32 0.29 218.99 0.77
POPN 7920927 10800000 64400 120000000 1.36 POPN 14200000 22900000 65128 169000000 1.62
OPEN 74.67 50.20 20.96 504.88 0.67 OPEN 74.75 46.63 6.32 531.74 0.62
ELF 0.65 0.22 0.084 0.92 0.34 ELF 0.68 0.21 0.08 0.92 0.32
Sub-Saharan Africa
Variable Mean SD Min Max CV
PC 1335.44 2144.57 50.04 13889.95 1.61
PCGRT 1.19 7.83 -50.24 142.07 6.57
ODA 12.89 13.24 -0.25 181.19 1.03
INV 20.97 16.88 -2.42 219.07 0.81
POPN 11600000 19100000 64400 169000000 1.65
OPEN 74.72 48.03 6.32 531.74 0.64
ELF 0.666 0.218 0.08 0.92 0.33
Source: Author’s computation using STATA
Note: PC is per capita income, PCGRTB is PC growth, ODA is official development assistance as a 
percentage of GDP, INV is investment as a percentage of GDP, POPN is population, OPEN is openness, 
and ELF is ethnolinguistic fractionalization.
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4.2 Empirical Analysis
Generally, for all the 22 models estimated, Hansen diagnostics tests show that 
the models are suitable. The Hansen J test statistic indicates that the instruments are 
appropriately uncorrelated with the disturbance process. Thus, this makes the in-
struments valid and satisfies the orthogonality conditions. Also, autocorrelation tests 
(AR1and AR2) indicate that there is no problem of serial correlation in the models.
The major focus at this point is to investigate if aid selectivity practice has really 
improved aid effectiveness in SSA. Tables 2. and 3. show the results for pre-selec-
tivity period, 1980 to 2000 (first period) and post-selectivity period, 2001 to 2012 
(second period), respectively. Interestingly, in the pre-selectivity period, foreign aid 
has significant negative relationship with economic growth in aggregate SSA. This 
result shows that as foreign aid increased between 1980 and 2000 in SSA, economic 
growth reduced. Of course, this period in history marked the time when most of SSA 
countries’ governance structures deteriorated greatly as many of the countries were 
governed by the military. However, if aid disbursement had been selective enough, 
may be the result would have been different. In terms of magnitude, a 1% increase in 
aid as a percentage of GDP reduces economic growth by 0.24% in SSA.
On the other hand, the post-selectivity period of the investigation reveals that 
foreign aid has insignificant positive relationship with economic growth in aggregate 
SSA. This result shows that this period (with the positive coefficient) is the period 
when increase in foreign aid is related with an increase in economic growth in SSA. 
Albeit, in terms of significance, the positive relationship that exists in the second pe-
riod is not vital; meaning an increase in economic growth as a result of an increase in 
foreign aid is not different from zero in the second period. Comparing these two pe-
riods, it can be argued that at least for the aggregate SSA regression, as a result of aid 
selectivity practice, the significant negative relationship of foreign aid with economic 
growth in the first period has improved to an insignificant positive relationship in the 
second period. This change may not be a noticeable one because of the insignificant 
positive relationship in the second period. However, breaking SSA into various sub 
groups may make the findings more interesting.
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Table 2.: System GMM for Foreign Aid and Economic Growth in Aggregate SSA and Other 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































691 249 249 104 120 112 571 116 567 265 424
Source: Author’s computation using STATA
Note: t-statistics of the GMM are in parentheses, while the figures in bracket are p-values for Hansen test 
and serial correlation test. ***, **,* represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 3.: System GMM for Foreign Aid and Economic Growth in Aggregate SSA and Other 











































































































































































































































































































































































































Observation 460 160 152 77 59 84 375 220 356 139 318
Source: Author’s computation using STATA
Note: t-statistics of the GMM are in parentheses, while the figures in bracket are p-values for Hansen 
test and serial correlation test. ***, **,* represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively.
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Regression results of sub groups of countries give clearer and more convincing 
results than aggregate SSA regression. In pre-selectivity period, foreign aid is nega-
tively related with economic growth in all of the categories, except for low aid inten-
sity group of countries which displays insignificant positive relationship. Moreover, 
half of the group of countries in pre-selectivity period (5 out of 10), excluding ag-
gregate SSA regression display significant negative relationship at 10% level at least 
between foreign aid and economic growth. This result further confirms that in pre-
selectivity period, aid has no good to offer SSA countries, as countries with low aid 
recorded positive relationship. The positive relationship in low-aid intensity group 
of countries lend support to the argument of Friedman (1958) and Bauer (1972) that 
foreign assistance to government is dangerous because it increases the power of the 
elite in the recipient governments, leads to corruption, discourages the growth of 
private sector investments, and encourages public sector-led growth, as well as eco-
nomic growth.
Against pre-selectivity regression results, Table 3, which presents the result 
for post-selectivity period shows that 6 models, excluding aggregate SSA regression 
display significant positive relationship at 10% level at least between foreign aid and 
economic growth. In all, foreign aid is positively related with economic growth in 8 
categories, out of which 3 are significant at 1% level (West Africa, non-oil producer 
and high aid intensity), 1 at 5% level (low aid intensity), 2 at 10% level (East Africa 
and oil producer); and 2 are insignificant (Southern Africa and low income). 
These results show that there is significant improvement in aid effectiveness 
as a result of aid selectivity practice in SSA. However, reference to the results of 
post-selectivity period, there are 2 groups of countries that still experience nega-
tive relationship between foreign aid and economic growth. Also, among the ones 
that experience positive relationships, 3 including aggregate SSA are insignificant. 
Thus, donors should intensify the practice of selectivity by favouring countries with 
stronger economic institutions and policies in a set of poorest countries. This should 
be done not only by giving aid to countries with sound governance alone, but also by 
targeting aid at improving governance. To complement this, donors can also increase 
the amount of aid given to SSA countries to improve results. 
5. CONCLUSION
Studies have vastly argued that donors favoured aid selectivity in post-2000 than 
what was the usual practice in pre-2000. However, the necessary question to ask is 
what is the impact of such practice on aid effectiveness? The answer to this question 
is straight forward. Aid selectivity practice improved aid effectiveness as aid trans-
lated to positive growth during period of post-selectivity as against negative growth 
in pre-selectivity period. Thus, the policy implications for this study are that donors 
should practice aid selectivity in aid administration to improve effectiveness. This 
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can be achieved by not only giving aid to countries with good governance, but also by 
using aid as a tool to improve governance. To complement this, volume of foreign aid 
flowing to favoured countries should be increased to ensure more and significant aid 
effectiveness in SSA countries.
Finally, this study identifies that perhaps it is ideal to investigate effectiveness of 
aid selectivity practice by differentiating between multilateral and bilateral aid. Thus, 
it suggests this demarcation for further research in order to address some grey areas 
in the literature.
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APPENDIX 1. LIST OF COUNTRIES IN SSA
Angola Ethiopia Niger
Benin Gabon Nigeria
Botswana The Gambia Rwanda
Burkina Faso Ghana Sao Tome and Principe
Burundi Guinea Senegal
Cameroon Guinea-Bissau Seychelles
Cape Verde Kenya Sierra Leone
Central African Republic Lesotho South Africa
Chad Liberia Sudan
Comoros Madagascar Swaziland
Rep. of the Congo Malawi Tanzania
Dem.Rep. of the Congo Mali Togo
Cote d’Ivoire Mauritania Uganda
Djibouti Mauritius Zambia
Equatorial Guinea Mozambique Zimbabwe
Eritrea Namibia
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APPENDIX 4. LIST OF COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL AFRICA
Angola Rep. of the Congo
Cameroon Equitorial Guinea
Central African Rep. Gabon
Chad Sao Tome & Principle
Dem. Rep. of the Congo




APPENDIX 6. LIST OF OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES
Angola Equatorial Guinea 
Cameroon Gabon
Cote d’Ivoire Nigeria
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo South Africa
Republic of the Congo 
APPENDIX 7. LIST OF NON-OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES
Benin Guinea Rwanda
Botswana Guinea-Bissau Sao Tome and Principe
Burkina Faso Kenya Senegal
Burundi Lesotho Seychelles
Cape Verde Liberia Sierra Leone






The Gambia Namibia Zimbabwe
Ghana Niger

